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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The State Division of Registration has not issued
licenses under The Massage Practice Act because the Legislature
failed to provide any means to establish a Board which can give
the required examinations.

The Division maintains that the

legislature must amend the statute in order to implement the
licensing provisions.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Both parties moved for Summary Judgment, with the
District Court granting the Division's Motion on the grounds
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that U.C.A. 58-47-1 et seq is not implementable and that the
internal problems were such that it would take legislative,
not judicial action to correct.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmation of the lower court's
ruling requiring the Utah Legislature to make the necessary
changes so that the act can be implemented.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The 1981 Utah State Legislature enacted Senate Bill
267, The Massage Practice Act (hereinafter referred to as
Act). Since that time the "Act" has been codified as
Sections 58-47-1 et seg, Utah Code Annotated (1981
Supplement).

The Act created a statutory scheme for the

licensure of masseurs practicing within the state.

As part

of the licensure system the Act provided for the
establishment of the Utah Board of Massage (hereinafter
referred to as Board).

Among other things, the Board is to

oversee the licensure of "massage technicians." The initial
exam is to be given by and under the

dire~tion

of the Board.

Prior to the passage of the Act there wer·e- no licensed
masseurs under the Act or any other state Act in the State
of Utah.
When the Director of the State Division of Registration
(hereinafter referred to as Director) attempted to create
the Board, he was faced with an impossible situation.

Sec-

tion 58-4-73, U.C. A.(1981 Supp.) states that the Board is to
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be created pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 1 of
Title 58, U.C.A.

Under the instructions provided the Direc-

tor of the Department in Section 58-1-6, U.C.A. (1981 Supp.),
the Board is to be comprised of 5 members.
tec~icians

4 are to be licensed massage
general public.

Of the 5 members,

and one from the

Since the Board is to prepare, oversee and

direct the examinations required for becoming massage technicians, and further, since there are presently no massage
technicians who are licensed, there is no way the Department
can appoint a Boardo

The Director has no choice but to fol-

low the statutese In the absence of qualified licensed masseurs, it is simply impossible to establish_ the Board and to
license anyone under the Act.
When the Director failed to implement the licensing provisions, plaintiffs initiated this action in district court
seeking a declaratory judgment requiring the creation of the
Board.

Defendants countered by asking for summary judgment,

there being no disputed facts.

The motions.of both parties

came on for hearing before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor in
September of 198le

After hearing oral arguments from both

parties, Judge Taylor issued an order finding that the Court
could not make the necessary changes in the wording of the
statute, "that matter being one of legislative jurisdiction."
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS. THERE IS NO NEED TO RESORT
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
It has long been the established policy of this court to
refrain from the use of statutory construction when the language
used in a disputed statute is clear and unambiguous.

This

principle was emphasized in the case of State v. Archuletta,
526 P.2d 911 (Utah, 1974), where the court stated:
"The intention of the legislature is to be
collected from the words they-employ. Where there
is no ambiguity in the words,,·there is no room for
construction." [citing United States v. Wiltberger,
5 Wheat 76, 95, 5 L. Ed. 37 (1920) (at 912)]
There is no ambiguity in the words of the sections
of the Act which created the Board.

The meaning of the

statute is clear, precise and subject to only one interpretation.

Section 58-47-3, U.C.A. (1981 Supp.)

indicates that

the Board is to be established pursuant to guidelines found
in Section 58-1-6, U.C.A. (1981 Supp.).

Therefore, the Board

should have five members, four licensed massage technicians
and one member of the general public .

Section 58-47-8, U.C.A.,

(1981 Supp.) indiates that in order to become a licensed massage technician, one must be examined.

The exam is to be

given by and under the direction of the Board.

Because

there are no licensed massage technicians, the Board cannot
be created.

There is no ambiguity in the Act.

is clear and precise.

The result

Absent licensed technicians, the Divi-
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sion cannot empanel the Board.

The examination is not waived

for anyoneo Only the educational requirements are waived for
those individuals who have been practicing for five years
or longero

The statute requires the examination to be admin-

istered by the Board.

Since no Board of Licensed Masseurs

can be established, the legislature must modify the language
to so allow a Board to be established to oversee licensing
matters before any licenses can be issuedo
Appellants present an excellent discussion of the power
of the courts to amend, add or omit words to the language of
ambiguous statutes.

Relying heavily on cases from other

jurisdictions, it is contended that if the L\ct is strictly
followed, it will lead to an absurd result or one at variance
with the intent of the legislature as a whole.

It is the

result which Appellants maintain creates the ambiguity
in the statute.
ambiguous.

Unusual results, as here, are not per se -

And as here, there is no ambiguity.

Clear lan-

guage creates a result that is hard to comprehend.

If that

is not what the Utah Legislature intended, then that body
should make the necessary changes to obtain the correct
result.
However, the cases cited by the Appellants are
easily distinguished from the facts of the case now before
the court.

In each case, the courts were faced with ambigu-

ities which existed in the langauge of the statutes themselves.
Rather than distinguish each case cited by Appellants, one
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case will illustrate the differences which exist between the
case now before this Court and those cases cited by Appellants.
In State v. Rawson, 312 P.2d 849 (Or. 1957) the Oregon Supreme
court was faced with determining which state agency controlled
the mineral rights to land upon which volcanic ash was to be
harvested.

Identifying the issue of the case the court stated:
"The whole case depends upon whether the
statute authorizing a lease by the land board
applies to the property in question."

The Court continued, saying:
"It is apparent that the same land cannot be
at the same time subject to the complete or exclusive control of two separate -state agencies, nor
can the funds expended and proceeds received come
from or be placed in two mutually exclusive funds."
The issue in Rawson is completely .different from the
issue now before the court.
the Act applies.

There is no question as to whom

There are no sections of the Act which are

in conflict with each other.
one board.

Masseurs can only be licensed by

No statute gives any other agency, commission or

board the authority vested in the Board.

Not only are the

words clear and unambiguous, but the application of the Act
is free from contradiction.

Absent such: ,._ambiguity there is no

room for construction.

Every jurisdiction cited by Appellants

embraces this doctrine.

The Oregon Court in Monaco v. United

States Fidelity &·Guaranty Co., 550 P. 2d 422 (Or. 1976)
stated:
"Whatever the legislative history of an act may
indicate, it is for the legislature to translate
its intent into operational language. This
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court cannot correct clear and·unambiguous
language for the legislature so as to better
serve what the court feels was or should have
been the legislature's intent." [citing Lane
County v. Hewtz Construction Co. et al, 228 Or.
152, 364 P. 2d 627 (1961); emphasis added]
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in the case of Rausch v.
Nelson, 134 N.W. 2d 519, 525 (ND} 1965) indicated that:
"Where the language of a statute is plain
and unambiguous, the court can not indulge in
speculation as to probable or possible qualifications which might have been in the mind of
the legislature, but the statute must be given
effect according to its plain and obvious meaning, and cannot be extended beyond it." [citing
59 C.J. pp. 955-957; city of Dickinson v. Thress,
69 N.D. 748, 290 N.W. 653 at 652]
It is contended by the Appellants that_because it is
impossible to set up the Board, following a strict interpretation of the stautes, an absurd result occurs and hence,
there is ambiguity.

However, it does not follow that impos-

sibility or implementation of the Act is an absurd result.
In the case of Hernandez v. Frothmiller, 204 P.2d 854,
68 Ariz 242 (1949), the Arizona Supreme

Cou~t

said:

"We recognize the rule that, when giving the
literal meaning to language of a statute results
in an absurdity or impossibility, courts will
under some circumstances alter, mooify, or supply words in order to give effect ·to the plain
intention of the lawmaker. This does not mean
that when language has a plain meaning to which
effect cannot legally be given, the court will
try to ciuess what the lawmakers intended."
(emphasis added).
It is further suggested by Appellants, that the failure
to include a "grandfather" clause in the Act was merely an
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oversight; that the intention of the legislature was to create a Board from the masseurs already practicing in the
state.

By asking this Court to superimpose its own section

in the Act, grandfathering in members of the Board, Appellants are asking the Court to second-guess the legislature.
In the case of Automobile Drivers and Demonstrators Union
Local v. Department of Retirement Systems, 529 P.2d 379,
92 Wash. 2d 415, appeal dismissed, certiorari denied 100
s.ct. 724, (1978), the Washington Supreme Court stated:
"This court cannot read into a statute that
which it may believe the legislature has omitted, be it an intentional or; ·inadvertent
omission".
'
rs it not equally probable that the Legislature was aware
of its actions and intentionally failed to include a "grandfather"
clause.

Again, it is not the duty of this court to second-

guess the Legislature.
In the case of Department of Labor and Industries v.
Cook, 269 P.2d 962 (WA 1954) the Washington Supreme Court was
faced with the problem of deciding whether or not it had the
authority to alter a statute which when given a strict interpretation caused an illogical result.· - . There was no ambiguity in the words of the statute.

The statute in question

allowed the Department a right to defend in superior courts
those board decisions which were favorable to the Department,
but denied the right to court action upon an adverse decision.
Speaking of the lack of logic in this situation, the Court
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stated:
"But, whether the seeming lack of logic in
this situation is the product of inadvertence
or intention, the fact remains that the act
lacks such a provision. The court cannot read
into a statute anything which it may conceive
that the legislature has unintentionally left
out."
I
I

It may be true that the failure to provide means to establish an initial Board is an illogical result.

But, the

logic of the statute is not the question before the Court.
The Act and the sections within the Act which provide the
guidelines for the creation of the Board are clear.
is but one interpretation that can be applied.

There

The Division

and the District Court have determined that_ the Board cannot
be created.
follow suit.

Absent ambiguity in the statute, this Court must
The problem presented by this case is best left

to those who created it, the Legislature.

II
THE COURTS DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO AND
SHOULD NOT LEGISLATE A CHANGE TO RECTIFY
THE PROBLEMS FOUND WITHIN THE ACT.
As has been suggested, Appellants are urging this Court
to create a "grandfather clause" to the Act.by allowing
certain individuals to be licensed without exam.

In support

of his position, counsel cited several cases which he declared support such action.

However, as explained in Argu-

ment I, nowhere does Appellant cite authority to support
the idea of modifying a clear and unambiguous statute.

By
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asking this Court to modify the Act, Appellants are asking
the Court to cross the barriers of separation of powers and
legislate a change in the Act.

Such action is clearly be-

yond the powers granted the Court.
Article V, Section 1 of the 1utah Constitution states:
j

I

The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and
the Judicial; and no person char~ed with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others, except in
the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
(Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court, ·beginning with cases around
the turn of the century have been quite conEistent that it
is not the position of the courts to legislate.

The Court in

Young v. Salt Lake City, 67 P. 1066 (Utah 1902) held:
The appellant contends that the statute under
which this proceeding was taken is unconstitutional and void, and that it attempts to
delegate power to the district court and
commissioners to legislate, and that the
power given is a legislative power, and that
the court cannot be invested with it by the
legislature, under the constitution. It is
true that, under the constitution, powers
belonging to one department of government
cannot be exercised by others.
Courts cannot
legislate or make laws. (Emphasis_added.)
Earlier, the court held in Kimball v. City of Grantsville,
57 P. 1 (Utah 1899):
Independently of any repugnance between a
legislative act, and any constitutional
limitation or restriction, a court has no
power to arrest its execution, however unwise
. or unjust, in the opinion of the court, it
may be, or whatever motives may have led to
its enactment.
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Accepting this as sound doctrine, as we safely may, would not the judicial department itself be guilty of transcending its constitutional power were it to inquire into the expediency, wisdom, or justice of the legislation
in question in this case? This, in itself,
would be an abuse, because it would be a usurpation of power by one department of the government which the people absolutely vested in another.
Appellants suggest that the principle of "separation of
powers" is not the issue in this caseo

It is suggested that

creating exceptions to the Act would merely be an extension
of the Court's proper function, (i.e. ,

-int~rpreting

the statu-

tory law promulgated by the other branch of government.)
Again; Appellants fail to understand that they are asking
the Court to do more than interpret the Acto

Interpret-

ing the Act leads one to the conclusion that the Board cannot be createdo
in statuteso

The Court interprets ambiguities found with-

Here, there are no ambiguitieso

How can the

Court interpret the words of the statute as creating exceptions
to the Act, which don't exist within the Acto
always embraced this principle.

The Courts have

In Travelers Indemnity Com-

pany v. Kowalski, 43 Cal. Rptro 843 (1965) the court stated:
"We recognize that the statute we are
reviewing must be given a liberal interpretation.
Nevertheless, . . . this "does not vitiate the
elementary principle that the judicial function
is simply to ascertain and declare what is in
terms or in substance contained in the statute,
not to insert what has been omitted, or omit what
. has been inserted." (emphasis added)
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The Nebraska court stated in City of Grand Island v.
County of Hall, 242 N.W. 2d 858, 196 Neb. 282 (1976) that:
"Where the language of a statue is plain and
unambiguous, no interpretation is needed and
the court is without authority to change the
language." [citing State v. Gallegos, 193 Neb.
651, 228 N.W. 2d 615. iEmphasis added.]
!

In Pedroli v; Missouri Pacific Railroad, 524 S.W.2d 882
(Mo. 1975), the Supreme Court of Missouri, referring to when
it is and is not appropriate-for the courts to amend a statute stated:
"When the language of a statute is unambiguous and conveys a plain and definite meaning,
the courts have no business to look for or to
impose another meaning [De Poortere v. Commercial Credit Corporation, 500 S.W._2d 724, 727
(Mo. App. 1973)]. If a statute -is unambiguous, a court should regard it as meaning what it
says since the legislature is presumed to have
intended exactly what it states directly."
(Emphasis added.)
Once the courts step beyond ascertaining and declaring what
is in terms or in substance contained in the statute, it ceases
its interpretation function and begins to usurp the power of the
legislature.

This Court, in Kimball, supra'said:

case the legislature alone can afford a remedy.

"In such
The judicial

department cannot arrogate to itself power:not within its province."

Even as late as State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah

1977) this Court was standing by that basic premise.

With the

problems within the Act itself, the Legislature has many options
to solve them.

The decision of which option to choose should

be left to it.
In Anderson v. I. M. Jameson Corporation, et al, 59 P.2d
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962, (CA 1936) the California Supreme Court explained that absent the ambiguity in the statute the courts must refrain
from correcting the statute even if the consequence would be
to defeat the object of the Act.

The Court stated:

"It is probably safe to assume that the
Legislature had in mind [a certain proviso]
but the difficulty is that they have not expressed this intent in the language usedo
This court has no power to rewrite the Section
so as to make it conform to a presumed inten
tion which is not expressed. This court is
limited to interpreting the Section, and such
interpretation must be based on the language
used . . . 'It is a cardinal rule with the construction of Sections that the intent of the
legislators should be followed, but this is
subject to the imperative and paramount rule
that the court cannot depart from the meaning
of language which is free from ambiguity, although the consequence would be to defeat the
object of the Act .. 11 [citing Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 5 P. 2d 882]
Even though the sustaining of the summary judgment
order would result in continued delay in the formation of the
Board, the Court is without authority to depart from the clear and
unambiguous language of the statute.

The Court cannot arrogate

to itself power not within its province.
the Act leads to only one conclusion.

Interpretation of

Implementation· of the

Act is not possible at the present time.

Fu~ther

legislative

action is needed.
I II.

THE APPELLANTS' CONTINUED OPERATION
AS A LEGITIMATE BUSINESS IS NOT IN
JEOPARDY.
In their brief, Appellants maintain that the Act
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pre-empts local regulation of the massage business.

Reference is

made to ordinances passed by Salt Lake County and South Salt
Lake which Appellants contend unduly restrict their business
practice.

In both instances, the ordinances exempt from li-

censure those masseurs who are licensed by the state.

If this

Court amends the Act, Appellants will no longer be subject to
restrictions which they feel jeopardize the continued operation of their business.
Appellants fail to realize that the exemption granted
by the ordinances for those licensed by the state simply indicates the intention of the local governing,bodies to regulate
their business in the event that the state fails to do so.
Furthermore, the Act does not pre-empt _local regulation. It
merely provides a system for state licensure and regulation.
There is no provision in the Act which prohibits counties or
cities from creating their own regulatory schemes relative to
the operation of massage business within their respective jurisdictions.

Licensing requirements along with procedures for

handling disciplinary proceedings is not blanket authority to
exclusive jurisdictiono

Al though, under . the Act, all masseurs

in the state must be licensed, nothing prohibits the introduction
of ordinances which further define the legitimate practice of
massage in a given jurisdictiono

Several professions which

are licensed by the State are likewise controlled by specific
ordinances which govern the operations of the professions within a given jurisdiction.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

Even if the Act did pre-empt local regulation, it
is of no significance to the issue now before the Court.

The

only issue beofre the Court is whether or not the courts
have the authority to amend an unambiguous Act in order to allow its implementation.

The

ord~nances

of which Appellants

complain have been duly enacted and fall within the parameters
of the Court's decisions in Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County
Commission, 624 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1981) and Hollingsworth v.
The City of South Salt Lake, 624 P. 2d 1149 (Utah 1981).

They

do not prohibit the operation of Appellant's legitimate business but merely restrict the manner in which it may be carried out.
Absent the establishment of the Board the Act can
have no practical effect.

Appellants do not run the risk of

being put out of business or of being criminally prosecuted
because of the Act.

The only result of the Court's decision

affirming Judge Taylor's order will be to leave the solution
of the problem to those who created it in the first place, the
Utah Legislature.

CONCLUSION
The language of the statute is clear.
ture requires all to pass an examination.

The Legisla-

The only waiver

relates to the educational training required for those having
five or more years of experience.
The Legislature did not "grandfather" any indivi-
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duals, and requires that a Board of "licensed" technicians
act as the Board.

This doesn't create ambiguity, but creates

a non-implementable statute that must be amended by the Legislature, not the Courts.
As such, this Court is urged to sustain the decision of
the District Court.

Dated this

Jb;-~ day

of May, 1982.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
brief to W. Andrew McCullough, Attorney at Law, 930 South state
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.5"~ day

of May, 1982.
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